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Introduction
Throughouttheworld, therehasbeenconsider-
able interestamong economic plannerscon-
cerning the creation of industrial clusters
(Harrison. 1992, 1994). Efforts to stimulate,
nurture and reinforce such clusters can be
found in virtually all of theEuropeannations,
as well as in Japan, Korea, China and others
(Malecki, 199]; Best, ]990). These efforts
rangefrom reinforcingthestrengthsof promis-
ing areasto stimulatingthe creationof totaJly
new technologies(Castells& Hall, ]99/i";.The
identificationof such clusteringoppon:.mities
hasbecomea critical elementof national,state,
regional and local planning activities.While
thereare many researcherswho havefocused
on this topic, the Harvard Business School's
Michael Porterhas, arguably,beenamongthe
mosteffectivein bringingthe idea to working
plannersin bothEuropeandtheUS. His books
and articles are widely read and analysedon
both sides of the At]antic and his ideashave
become increasingly commonplacein main-
streamplanningfor economicdevelopment.Of
particular note is his work The Competitive
Advantageof Nations(Porter,1990).It remains
to be seen,however.what happenswhen one
attempts to implement Porter's principles
throughlocal planning.
A glimpseat what happenedin Barre, Ver-
mont betweenSeptember1994and February
]995'could help answer that question. From
September]994, the authors were part of a
teamof scholarsandpractisingplanners,com-
missionedby themayorand thecity adminis-
tration to conceptualise and prepare an
e~onomicdevelopmentplan for the city. We
worked with more than ]00 local citizens,
businessleaders,community leadersand trade
group representatives,to develop a plan that
was largely basedupon Porter's concepts.
This paperis a summaryandanalysisof the
team's efforts. While one case study cannot
conclusively determineanything, we hope to
help clarify issuesfor similar economicdevel-
opmentplanningin otherareas,and to contrib-
ute to researchinto the effeclivenessof the
Porterapproach.
The Concept of Industrial Clustering
The notionof places,regionsandevennations
acquiringa comparativeadvantagedue to cer-
tain industrialsectorsclusteringtogetheris not
new.The first theoristto examinecomparative
advantagewas the eighteenth-centuryBr!tish
economistDavid Ricardo. who studiedthe in-
terrelationsbetweengrowing capitalistmarkets,
tradeand regionalor nationalpatternsof econ-
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omic specialisation.In his conception,compar-
ativeadvantagerenectsthedistributionof natu-
ral resources, climate, labour costs and
differencesin technologyembodiedin thepro-
duction process. By the nineteenthcentury,
neoclassicaltheory,emphasisingthe natureof
demandand marginalcostsand benefits,over-
shadowedclassicaltheoriescentredaroundthe
labourtheoryof value.The neoclassicaltheory
of comparativeadvantageincludes more than
one factorof production,i.e. capitalas well as
labour, and allows for the incorporali.onof
demand, which Ricardo ignored (Walsh &
Gram, 1980).
Industrial clusters have been identified In
Europe for generations-machining steel in
Sheffield,textilesaroundPrato in Italy, chemi-
cals alongtheRhine, automobilesin thesouth-
west German state of Baden-Wurtlemberg,
financialservicesin Londonand fashiondesign
in ParisandMilan. The mostnotableclustersin
theUS arctheelectronicsindustryin theRoute
128areaaroundBoston and the computerin-
dustryin California's Silicon Valley. Industrial
clustersare emergingaroundmedicaldevices
(Minneapolis), biotechnology (San Diego.
Worcester, Massachusetts), semiconductors
(Austin) andsoftware(SeattlclPortland).
Over the past decade,industrial policy ex-
pertshavecometo realisethata positivelocal
environmentis essentialin developingglobal
competitiveness.The interactionof peers,com-
petitors,local universitiesand thelocalgovern-
mentis crucial for the long-tern1successof a
firm. Scholars such as Annallee Saxenian
(1994)agreethat regionsoffcr :l competitive
advantageto certainindustrialclustersevenas
productionand marketsbecome increasingly
global in nature.That proximity promotesre-
peatedinteractionand themutual trustneeded
\0 sustaincollaborationand enhancetechno-
logicaladvancement.Sheargues,however,that
spatialclusteringalone docs not createmutu-
ally beneficial interdependencies.There is a
needfor thecomplexof institutionalandsocial
relationshipsthatconnectthe prodUt:erswithin
a region'sfragmentedindustrialstructure.Ben-
nettHarrison.in supportingthe theoryof clus-
ters,arguesthatagglomer:llionsof small- and
medium-sizedcompaniesalone will nO!create
significantsuccess.There is J needfor bigger
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firms to help upgradethetechnicalcapabilitie1
of their smaller suppliers.
After analysingcomponentsof effective in·
dustrialclustersin theUS andabroad,Michae
Porter developed the 'Diamond' model fOI
competitive industrial clusters. He identifiee
four importantaspectsof economicactivitytha
are essentialto a strong industrial base.The
first relatesto 'Factor Conditions'. It is here
that the role of governmentand local institu·
tions makes a difference. In order for loca'
industry to succeedit must have the cooper·
ation of local government.Governmentmus:
providethewater,sewer,highwayandtelecom·
municationssystemsthatenablecompanieste
compete.Governmentmustalsoplaya key role
in training the workforce. For example, the
plasticscluster in Fitchburg/Leominster.Mas·
sachusellshas usedtheservicesof the Univer·
sity.of Massachusells(Amherst)for assistance
in dealing with chemical compounds (poly·
mers) and the University of MassachusetH
(Lowell) for assistanceon theshop noor.
The secondclementof Porter's model cen·
treson 'DemandConditions'.These relateto <
growing national (or local, but not inler·
national) demand and market for products
Porter's model requiresmore than increasing
outputbasedon havingthecheapestproduct;i'
requiresproducersandbuyers\0 work togethel
\0 insurethatprice.qualityandefficienciesare
working cooperatively within a community
When this occurs. there is a prospect for ar
ever-increasingspirit of innovationthro'ughou'
the industry. The loc::11plastics industry ir
NorthemWorcesterCounty (MAj, for example
has caught this spirit and moved from chea~
plastic forks and spoons to high-tech 'sur
screening' night goggles ror helicopterpilot1
operatingin desertconditions.
The third clementcentreson 'Related ane
SupportingIndustries'.When foreign or inter·
national suppliers have been globally tested
theywill incvitablyhelpdomeslicend-produce:
companiesimprovetheirproductsandscrvices
Typically. they will have prospered in the
world markethy upgradingand improvingpro
duction techniques. processes and outputs
They can then bring their entrepreneurialcui
lure to the domestic firms. where a highe:
degreeof L'ompetitivcnesscan emergethrougf
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mutually desired innovation, the transfer of
informationand a close working relationship.
Portermaintainsthatthereis a decidedadvan-
tagewhen thesuppliersand endproducersare
locatedin thesamearea:new ideasare tested
moreeasily,informallearningresultsandnews
of the marketplaceis shared.The integrating
factor in Porter's Diamond is the fourth and
final element: 'Firm Strategy, Structure and
Rivalry'. Most companiesdo not define their
strategiesin a comprehensivemanner.National
industryleadersmorecommonlydevelopstra-
tegicplansbasedon thebestanalysisof world
marketsandtrends,andthestrengthsandweak-
nessesof their competition.Small companies
do notgenerallypossesstheeconomiesof scale
necessaryto undertakesuch comprehensive
strategicplans,however.Among smallerfirms.
strategicplanningis often informal, inductive,
reactiveand too frequently lives only in the
headof the chief executiveofficer.
Companystructureis alsoan importantcom-
ponentof Porter's fourth element.Experience
showsthatsole proprietorshipswith local roots
tend to stay in their presentlocationseven if
market advantagescan be found elsewhere.
However, family-owned businesses change
over timeand thecommitmentto placedimin-
ishesas older generationsretire.For planners
and local officials interestedin attractingand
retainingbusinesses.corporatestructurecan be
an importantindicatorof corporatestability.If
lines of successionare unclear,if mergersare
in thewind, or if theexisting location'sattrac-
tivenesswanes,thena companywould appear
to be in dangerof relocating.
When rivalry among competitors,suppliers
and customersexists there is continual im-
provementin productqualityandan upgrading
of labour. This is demonstratedin the more
than 20 papercompanieswithin 10 miles of
Holyoke,Massachusetts('The PaperCity'), the
30 plastics companies within 10 miles of
Leominster,Massachusetts('The PioneerPlas-
tics City') andthehundredsof high-technology
companies within ]0 miles of Route 128
('America's Technology Highway'). Local
rivalry with mutualcooperationcanresultin an
environment that has a strong competitive
advantage,where change is viewed as an
opportunity.
Organisationscanhelpfosterthisspirit in the
presenceof companyrivalries. A government
'Iabcratory'createdsucha spirit in thecaseof
North Carolina's Research Triangle Park
(Lugar & Goldstein, 1992).The presenceof a
stronguniversitycanfosterthesamespirit.The
spin-off companiesfrom Stanford,Duke, MTT
and the University of Texas, among others,
provide examples of how this can happen
(Dertouzosel aI., 1989).A single university
departmentcanalsohelpto stimulatethisspirit,
as in the caseof the University of Massachu-
setts Polymer Studies Department.Another
organisationalstructure,perhaps less widely
recognised,is an industrynetwork.Networksin
the paper,plasticsand granite industrieshave
beenquiteeffective.On the otherhand, these
networks can becomeoverly protective and
mayfocuson 'fightingthelast war' ratherthan
on fosteringa spirit of healthycompetitionin
thepresenceof industrialchange.
Industrialclusteringdoes not occur sponta-
neously.There must be companieswithin an
industrythat competeagainsteach other, so-
phisticatedsuppliers that co-exist with local
firms, companieswhose strategicplans define
theircompetitionin a global framework,anda
desirefor improvement.
Barre, Vermont, The Granite Capital
The City of Barre, population9482, is located
in central Vermont between Montpelier and
WhiteRiver Junction.approximately]30 miles
from Montreal, Canada.and 200 miles from
Boston.Massachusetts(seeFigure ]). First set-
tled in 1769,it quickly becameknown for its
vastquantitiesof granite.By thelatenineteenth
century,Barrehadbecomeknown as thegran-
ite capitalof the world. Although theclaim is
somewhatof an overstatement.hecity sits on
one of the most extensivegranitedepositson
theglobe.Geologistsestimatethatthe deposit
is four miles long, two miles wide and ten
milesdeep.
The graniteindustryis the largestindustrial
sector in Barre. There are approximately60
granitecompanieslocated in the Barre area.
They employapproximately1000workerswith
anadditional400workerssupplyingtransporta-
tion, machineryor equipmentrepair services.
3]3
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FIGURE I. The locationof Barre. Vermont.
The value of the products manufacturedin
Barre is estimated at approximately SI 00
million per year. Approximately 47%' of
this representsthe cost of materials,while
53% represents'value added'. This relatively
low percentageof valueaddedreflectsa reluc-
tance by companiesto invest in high tech-
nology or to take efforts to improve worker
productivity.
The workforce is predominantlyblue collar
but very well paid by Vermont standards.In-
deed,amongmanufacturingoccupations.only
theele.ctricalworkersin Vermontearna higher
hourly wage. Most of the workers own their
own homes.Moreover,Barre has virtually no
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major crime and contains some of the most
spectacularnatural resources in the nation.
There is little turnover in personnel in the
graniteindustry,andsonshavefollowed fathers
into the quarries for generations.Based on
citizensurveysandfocussessions.thereareno
obvious signs of a widespreaddesire among
residentsto broaden the city's industrial or
occupationalbase.
The State of Barre's Industry
Changes in the granite industry are sending
signsof forebodingover Barreand its industry.
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Although Barre's finns have carved out a
strong market niche, granite sales are in a
gradual decline and new quarries are being
developedacrossthe UnitedStates.In fact, by
tonsof rock cut andshipped,quarriesin Elber-
ton, Georgia now out-producethose found in
Barre. The Barre industryhas long speciaJised
in rough-cutstoneandgravemarkers.Approxi-
mately90-95%of Barre'sproductionis memo-
rials andmonuments.
Thereareclearsignsthatthegraniteindustry
as a whole hasnot adaptedto changingmarket
conditions.American buildersare increasingly
moving away from the use of granite as a
buiJding materia];one reasonfor this may be
that the industryhas faiJed to standardiseits
cutting procedureslike the brick, marbleand
concreteindustries.The industryhasalsofailed
to 'addvalue' to its product.The marbleindus-
try has done far more to modernisethan the
granite industry and could serve as a model.
Neither the Rock of Ages Company,the lead-
ing granitecompanyin Barre, nor the Barre
Granite Association (BGA), has made any
noteworthyattemptsto addvalueto theirprod-
uct.
The Rock of Ages Company is the prime
exampleof the industry'sshortcomings.Rock
of Ages has six quarries in Barre alone and
many more acrossthe Northeast.Becausethe
companyis basedin nearbyNew Hampshire,it
functionsas an absenteeowner. In its constant
quest to hold down costs and competein the
industry, Rock of Ages' business strategy
makesit more like a multinationalcorporation
thana home-grownfinn. The companychooses
its rock-cuttingand selling sites, in part,with
an eye toward achievingeconomiesof scale.
The company'sfreedomtochoosewhereit cuts
rock meansthatRock of Ages does not need
Barre as much as Barre needsRock of Ages.
To date, the companyhas servedas a 'good
citizen'. It participatesin communityevents.is
an activememberof theBGA. andoperatesthe
BarreGranite Industries'Visitors' Ce:nre.This
s.upplementsits inordinateimpacton the local
economy.
A key factorthatcould influencethe furore
of Barre's graniteindustryis increasinginter-
nationalcompetition.Under the World Trade
Organisation(WTO), all tariffson granitewill
eventuallybe removed.Already, granite from
as far away as India is quarried,cut, finished,
polishedandshippedto theUS at a lower cost
than a similar product can be supplied by
Barre's companies.There are other nations,
suchas Italy andSpain, thatalso havea ready
supplyof thematerialandlow extractioncosts.
Considering the slipping domesticdemand
for granite, the powerful position of Rock of
Ages within Barre's industry,andgrowing in-
ternationalcompetition,Barre's granite indus-
try hascausefor concern.This ledofficials and
someindustryleadersin Barre to considerhow
industrialclusteringcould help.
The Potential for Planning an Industrial
Cluster in Barre
From the startof this project, the mayor and
town managersaw the need for change far
moredearly thandid thegraniteindustry.The
local governmentalleadershipknew that the
industrywasnot growing,wageswere flat and
Barre's marketshare was eroding, It clearly
neededto stimulatechange,but had little ex-
perience,in planning for economic develop-
ment. After looking at many approaches,the
leadershipfelt quite comfortablein using the
industrial clustering concept as a means of
detennining the state of Barre's industries,
identifyingweaknessesand providing a focus
for potentialmunicipalactions,Tne resultsare
explainedbelow,
Although the local governmenthad cometo
recognisethe needfor changein its relations
with the granite industry, its past record in
providing Porter's Factor Conditions was
mixed.Its role wasprimarilyas a providerand
guarantorof a social safetynet for its citizens.
In otherwords,economicplanningand assist-
ancewerenot of primaryimportance.The city
hadput togethera 'StoneTrades' programmeat
the high school that regularly prepared 10
workersper year for the industry.but had no
initiatives at the more significant university
I~vel.(Vermont's universitiesand collegesdo
~othavea traditionof direct outreach.)
After reviewing the impact of their orien-
tationwith the consultingteam.local govern-
mentofficials cameto seethattheycould play
an interventionaryrole in stimulatinggrowth
~L"i
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within their industrialbase,and createa bal-
ancebetweenprovidinga social safetynetand
supportinglocal companies.The shift in atti-
tude was markedby. modestbut noteworthy
initiatives.Zoning was quickly alteredto meet
companies'expansionplans, ideasweregener-
atedfor theestablishmentof a granitemuseum
in the city, and local officials helped write
legislationto requirethe use of granitein all
Vermont public buildings.The shift was also
evident in the searchfor financialassistance.
For yearstheCentral Vermont EconomicDe-
velopmentCorporationhad a small revolving
loan fund (RLF) sponsoredby the US Econ-
omic DevelopmentAdministration(EDA), but
it had goneunnoticedby mostBarreofficials.
After the study was completed,however,the
leadership becameactive in obtaining more
resourcesfrom the fund. They are also now
detcrminedto be active players in the EDA-
requiredOverall Economic DevelopmentPro-
gramme (OEDP). Local governmentnow at
leastconsidersthe improvementof thegranite
businessas beingwithin its realmof responsi-
biJities.
However, Barre's 'hard-rock' resistanceto
changeis perhapsbestillustratedby theunwill-
ingness of the granite industry to provide
Porter's secondcritical elementof industrial
dusters: meeting the level of demand for
productand keepingup with productbuyers'
increasingsophistication.Barre's granitecom-
panieshavebeenslow to innovate.reluctantto
marketnewproducts,andunwilling to adjustto
a changingindustry.The skills. tools andmar-
ket exist for Barre to becomea duster where
thedemandsfor improvedproductsandgreater
competition stimulate 'value-added' product
development.However,theBGA andthechief
executiveofficers of many granitecompanies
tendto seeBarre'sprimarybusinessasmoving
rock and cuttinggravestones.
Suppliers to Ba,rre'sgranite industry have
made little effort to becomeglobally compe-
titive. Employers and businessowners were
surveyed by the consulting team, and when-
askedaboutthe int'iuenceof WTO or NAFT A
they initially argued. like the industry itself.
that these agrcementswill hurt Barre. When
asked about the int'iuenceof the European
Union or theneedto follow internationalstan-
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dards,they arguedthatthosedevelopmentsarf
irrelevant.
Porter's capstone point, 'Firm Strategy.
StructureandRivalry', points to anotherweak
spot in Barre's industry: formal planning i>
rare.Companies'strategicplansare developed
through informal processes,often determined
by thegut instinctsof companyexecutives,In
theabsenceof significantchangesin theindus-
try, the firms on the whole have performed
quite well. But if change is coming to the
industry, as even local governmentofficials
haverecognised.thenmoreformalprocessesof
strategicplanningare neededto deal with the
increasingcomplexityof the industry.
There is a greatdeal of rivalry in Barre's
granite industry,but as the dominantfirm in
Barreandone of the leadinggranitecompanies
in the US, Rock of Ages setsthe tone. It has
namerecognition,a formal corporatestructure,
and a dearer senseof world trends than the
smaller firms. Rock of Ages' hegemonyper-
hapsprovidesthebestexplanationof theresist-
ance in Barre to the adoptionof a clustering
strategy.Rock of Ages sees Barre as only a
point of supply for thegranitethey need.The
. companystrategyappearsto be to extractthe
rock at the lowest possiblecost. therebymain-
tainingtheir dominantposition in the industry.
An industrialclusterwould necessarilyrequire
the formationof a new, moreaggressivetrade
association(which Rock of Ages would pay a
majority of the funds to support)and the en-
tranceof granitecompetitorsto the Barre re-
gion. Both of thesedevelopmentswould work
againstthecompany'sgoals. In addition.com-
panymanagementdoesnot tive in thecity and
thereforewould not benefit personally from
furthereconomicdevelopment.
A number of the basic componentsfor an
industrialclusterare presentin Barre. Barre's
naturalgranite resourcesare by all measures
immenseand demandhas beenhealthy.Thcre
are still impedimentsto creatinga truly com-
petitive environment.Barre's inability to de-
velop its granite businesses into a. special
industrialduster is due in largepartto a rather
feeble trade association,an increasinglyout-
datedmarketorientation,a lack of commitment
to 'value-added'products,a reluctanccto com-
pcte in the world marketplace.and inadequate
assistancefrom government.
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Lessons Learned
In trying to apply Porter's modelto Barre,we
identifiedseveralpoints thateitherreceivein-
adequateattentionin his approachor present
interesting complications not explicitly ad-
dressedby Porter. These issuesshould be of
interest to economic and industrial planners
who are also interestedin applyingthemodel.
The two main issueshavetodo with theroleof
governmentinterventionand the role of the
graniteindustry.
The role of governmentalinterventionis
critical to producingPorter'sFactorConditions.
Local governmentleadershipcan indeed be-
comemore interventionist,but thatgovernment
interventionby itself is not enoughto reverse
thesituation.After focusingon alternativeap-
proaches,theadministrationdeterminedthat it
could help the local industrialbase in several
ways. First, it was to ensurethatgovernment
did not serve as an impedimentto growth.
Thus, thepublic leadershipmadesurethatthe
necessarywater,sewerandotherinfrastructure
capacitywas in place.Second,thegovernment
officials were very sensitiveto the industry's
needfor favourabletaxpolicies.Local property
taxeswere kept low. Further,thecity adminis-
trator,as well asBarre'sstatesenatorsandstate
representatives,worked to keep workmen's
compensation and unemployment"insurance
costs as low as possible.Third, the city was
more than willing to use public funds to find
new industrialsites so the granitecompanies
could expand within the city boundaries.
Finally, its educationand banking institutions
wereoriented,as muchas possible,to meetthe
needsof the industry.
In orderto havea significantimpact.therole
of governmentmust be clearly defined and
carriedoutconsistentlyoveranextendedperiod
of time. Equally important,local government
mustknow its limits. It cannotdirectlychange
federalpolicy, intervenein businessoperations
or predictworld events.In Barre,localgovern-
menteventuallycame to recogniseits role in
nurturingthecity's graniteindustry.
However, the necessarychangeswere not
forthcoming in the granite industry. Not all
companies strive for increasedgrowth. If a
companyis makinga high returnon its invest-
ments, has little debt, and can see a solid
demandfor its product, it may well continue
to operateas it is. The presenceof a competi-
tive advantagewill not, by itself, result in an
automaticwillingness to takeon risk. As long
as the owners are making a solid return on
investmentand the immediate future appears
secure,they will continue to operateas they
havein thepast.There are many such compa-
nies in Barre.
Other importantlessonsof theBarre experi-
enceare notedbelow.
• The presenceof theelementsof an industrial
cluster does not lead automatically to in-
creasedcompetitiveness.In thecaseof Barre,
severa!elementswerein place,but therewas
no catalyst to precipitate the necessary
changein attitudewithin thegraniteindustry.
• The dominanceof one company in a local
cluster contributesto a climate of uncer-
tainty.There is never'perfectequilibrium' in
any industrialcluster.
• While the role of governmentis understood,
industrial assistanceprogrammes are still
viewed with greatscepticism.They are per-
ceived as overly complicated,too intrusive
andcoming with too many stringsattached.
In theBarrecase,thegraniteindustryheldto
theold adagethat governmentgovernsbest
when it governsleast.
• Industrialassociationscan be instrumentalin
either promoting industrial clusters or im-
pedingtheirdevelopment.They often reflect
the wishes of the larger membersof the
organisationratherthanthe view of the ma-
jority. In order to promoteclusters,associa-
tionsneedto leadtheir industriesratherthan
follow them.
• Developinglocal pointsof pride is important.
. Boosterism,statues(Figure 2), museumsand
festivalscan help to createa senseof pride
andcreatea bondbetweenthecitizensandthe
industry.They may have little direct impact
onthebottomline butcanhavea greatimpact
on corporateandcommunitymorale..
• Industriesneedto establishbetterlinks with
institutionsot"higher education. There ap-
pears to be little understandingin Barre's
local governmentof how to bring together
educationalinstitutionsto supportan indus-
trial cluster. Despite the best effoI1sof the
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FJGt.:RE 2. The Stonecutter"sMonument.Main Street.Barre.Vermont.
vocational school. the community colIege
and thePrivateIndustriesCouncil (PIC). the
resultsin Barreare unsatisfactory.The gran-
ite industry.like mostother industriesin the
US. wants entry-level workers with good
basic skills. The firms will train themin the
particularcompany-establishedmethods:the
industryhasa substantialack of confidence
in highereducation.
• The creationof an industrialclusterin Barre
requiresa change in the industI"}'sculture.
Such a changehasnot occurred.The poten-
tial existsto movetowardhighervalue-added
businesses.suchasfrom extractionto cutting
to standardisationto specialitymarketingto
retail goods.Such changes.however.do not
occur overnight.and the trip from a Barre
quarryto a Manhattandesigner"sstudiocan
be a longone indeed.A.crucial lessonof the
Barre experience.is that industrial clusters
haveto evolve over time.
• There is no set formula for creating an
industrial cluster. It must be groundedby
an institution. natural resources.or a core
company in order to emerge. But beyond
those preconditions. the process of indus-
trial cluster formation remains somewhat
iII-defined.
We realisethat a single case offers only a
snapshotofa communityandits industryatone
momentin time. However. if the findingsare
similar in other communitiesendeavouringto
developclusters.then there is reasonto shift
our focus decisively from the other factorsin
the.Portermodeltowardtheleadershipenviron-
ment.
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